An efficient design of the security architecture for a computer network requires the integration of security implementation considerations with a formal security model describing the security policy in the network. The distributed nature of t h e network, however, offers complexities in the development of appropriate models. In this paper, a new model which precisely describes the mechanism t h a t enforces the security policy and requirements for a multilevel secure network is described. This mechanism attempts t o ensure secure flow of information between entities assigned to different security classes in different computer systems connected to t h e network. The mechanism also controls the access to the network devices by the subjects (users and processes executed on behalf of the users) with different security clearances. The model integrates the notions of access control and information flow control to provide a Trusted Network Base (TNB) t h a t imposes appropriate restrictions on the flow of information among the various devices. Utilizing simple set theoretic concepts, a procedure is given to verify the security of a network t h a t implements the present model.
INTRODUCTION
The demand for protecting the privacy and the integrity of messages as they traverse a communication network has been on the increase in recent years. When a set of computers are interconnected to form a network, the protection mechanisms residing within the individual computers t h a t prevent unauthorized access to the files and illegal flow of information between files stored within these computers become inadequate to ensure the security of interprocess communications across the network. This is due t o the distributed nature of the network architecture, the high degree of openness of the network medium and the increased need for sharing resources within the network for accessing centralized storage facilities and for exchanging d a t a and programs among users. Hence a security enforcement mechanism for the network is required in addition to t h e existing protection mechanisms within the individual computers.
Security modelling techniques have been widely used in the design of protection mechanisms for the operating systems of stand-alone computers. The process of modelling usually involves the development of a formal mathematical model t h a t precisely describes the protection policy t h a t the computer system should enforce [l]. In addition to assisting in the identification of explicit approaches t o the design of security mechanisms, such models are useful in the verification of the security of a system implementing a mechanism t h a t enforces the security policy described by the model. In the case of networks, security implementation considerations (such as encryption, network protocols, topology etc.) should be integrated with a formal security model in order t o produce a viable security architecture [2].
A large number of security requirements for computer networks have been identified in t h e literature. For purposes of this paper, we shall consider a subset of these to identify the basic requirementst for a network to be secure as : control unauthorized access to the devices connected to the network; prevent the unauthorized dissemination of d a t a stored in the network equipment; and adequately protect t h e privacy and the integrity of d a t a when transmitted on the communication channels.
Correspondingly, a secure network hence requires three types of control: access control, information flow control and cryptographic control. The basic function of access control is t o ensure t h a t accesses t o the objects by the subjects are authorized. Access control has been widely applied t o the design of protection mechanisms in operating systems .[4,5], and several access control models have been developed in the past. Some typical models are the High-Water Mark Model apadula Model [7-101, UCLA D a t a Secure Model information of different security classifications from users with different security clearances) can be provided in a computer network. Protection against inter-process communication threats through the use of network protocols has been discussed by Voydock and Kent 1411 . A more complete and conceptually more appealing development of a security model for a specific application (viz. Military Message Systems) is given by Landwehr et. a1.[42] .
With the work on modelling security in stand-alone computer systems having attained a degree of maturity through the publication [43] of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) and its acceptance as a standard for the Department of Defense (DoD), it is only natural to attempt t o extend these concepts to network security problems. Initial arguments in this direction are given by Anderson 1441 and Walker [45] . Anderson [44] has proposed t h a t network security issues can be handled with the same concepts t h a t apply to the security of single computer systems and has presented the requirements for building a network t h a t operates in the Dedicated, System High, Controlled and Multilevel m0des.f Walker (451 has studied various ways of connecting both untrusted and trustedtt computer systems to a network in order to determine which portions of the overall network can be trusted and which security policy is to be enforced. Very recently, however, Nessett [46] has pointed o u t the inadequacy of these studies in addressing some important security issues in distributed systems t h a t may not be of particular relevance in stand-alone systems.
In order to briefly describe the additional complexities involved in designing a security mechanism for a computer network, let us consider a typical local network t h a t includes several computer systems which store d a t a of various sensitivity levels, several terminals that allow the users to access the network directly, several workstations between which d a t a can be exchanged, several printers where the contents of the files can be printed on a hard copy, and several other d a t a processing equipment such as databases, electronic mail servers etc. t h a t can process d a t a of different classification levels. Let us assume t h a t the systems t h a t are trusted to process classified d a t a have appropriate security mechanisms installed to support the control of information flow between the files and the users of the same system. In such an environment, when a piece of information t h a t is classified at a certain sensitivity level in a system is requested to be transferred t o a file residing in a different system, or a network user wishes to access the network through a connected device, several 'additional problems should be taken into consideration. Firstly, due to the distributed nature of the network, any localized security enforcement mechanism (a reference monitor in the security kernel of a computer, for instance) cannot adequately mediate all accesses and protect all information transmitted over the network. Secondly, whereas the security enforcement mechanism for a computer system can be verified to control the information flow within the system, such a mechanism cannot enforce any security policy concerning the flow of information outside the system, i.e., the flow from one system t o another system within the network. Furthermore, this mechanism cannot enforce the policy concerning the authorization of the accesses t o the network devices by the network user or the processes executed on behalf of the users.
t tt
These four modes of operation are defined by the DoD in accrediting computer systems processing classified information and serve t o categorize the degree of trust placed in them (431. A trusted computer system is a system t h a t has a Trusted Computing Base (TCB) class > B1. as defined in TCSEC 1431 and it may be operated either in the Controlled or the Multilevel mode. An untrusted system has a T C B class < B2 and i t may only be operated in either the Dedicated mode or the System High mode.
Hence, the problem of interest is -how t o design a security mechanism for a network which is trusted t o process classified information at multiple security levels without compromising the security? Evidently, implementation of a T C B in the processing elements (computer systems) attached t o the network which performs access control functions alone will not be sufficient and a more elaborate security mechanism that is distributed across the network to perform both access control and information flow control functions is required.
If one regards the entire network as one unit t h a t has a single jurisdictive (a network security officer who is part of the control center) t h a t can implement and enforce the security policy for the network, one can envision the implementation and the enforcement at a conceptual level by a network reference monitor which is analogous to the reference monitor in the T C B for a single computer system 17-10], The actual implementation of the network reference monitor function could take varied forms depending on the availability of trusted computer systems connecting t o the network, their permitted modes of operation and the levels of trust required for the network devices. The enforcement mechanism in the security kernel implementations of the reference monitor can be embedded in the network interface devices, network front-end processors, switches and the like t o enforce the access control (both discretionary and mandatory) decisions. Following the terminology initially used by Walker [451, we shall refer to this distributed protection mechanism as a Trusted Network Base (TNB), which is analogous to the T C B in a single computer system.
In this paper, we shall describe a security model t h a t precisely describes the mechanism enforcing the security policy for a network capable of handling information at different security classification levels and serving users with different security clearances. In the next section, we shall consider a number of specific connection scenarios within the network and some typical interactions between specific network devices t o identify the functions of the T N B and t o describe some possible implementations. This will be followed by an informal description of the security requirements for the network, which further leads to a more formal model t h a t describes the way in which transitions from a n initial secure state of the network t o the succeeding states under the permitted transformations can take place. The procedure followed for the development of the model is inspired by the work of Landwehr et. a1.1421 on Military Message Systems; the present work, however, has a more expanded scope and is more general. Finally, by examining how a network implementing the security policy enforced by the present model satisfies the security requirements at each stage of a typical connection, a verification of the network security is conducted.
Since the protection of the privacy and the integrity of d a t a from wiretapping attempts during transmission on the network lines can be ensured by an appropriate encryption technique together with an effective key management scheme, a greater focus will be given to the two other basic security requirements stated earlier, viz.
to control the access t o network equipment for which some users may not have the required clearance to use, and b. to control the flow of information between various network devices to prevent unauthorized dissemination.
O u r concern in this paper is to model a multilevel security environment t h a t allows both untrusted and trusted computer systems, other d a t a processing and 1/0 devices connected to a single network with one jurisdictive authority -the Network Security Officer (NSO), who is trusted to a.
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assign the necessary security clearances to the users and the security classifications to the devices. Extensions to environments t h a t are characterized by multiple jurisdictive authorities with differing degrees of trust, although possible, require several other considerations, and are outside the scope of the present work.
IDENTIFICATION OF TNB FUNCTIONS IN A TRUSTED NETWORK
Before we define the requirements of T N B function, let us give the definitions of some terms used to describe various scenarios for the connection of devices to a trusted network.
Definition of Terms Used
a.
b.
Entity -A network resource (physical device, d a t a file, memory. or process) or a 1esitimat.e user. Subject -An active entity which takes a n action on another entity. A subject can be a network user, or any entity (such as processes, jobs and programs) acting on behalf of a user. Object -A passive entity, which is acted upon by another entity. An object can be an identifiable resource or a d a t a container connected t o the network. An object may contain another object. Note t h a t an entity can be a subject at one instant of time and can become an object at another instant of time. The determination of whether some entity is a subject or an object is based on the function which it executes or it is executed upon.
User -A person who is authorized t o use the network.
User ID -A string of characters identifying a network user. Each user has a unique userID. When a user logs into the network, he must present a userID to identify himself. Then the network (interface unit) performs a reliable authentication t o confirm t h a t the current user is the person corresponding to t h a t userID. Security Class -The fundamental security attribute of all entities within the network. The security class comprises a sensitivity level (e.g., UNCLASSIFIED, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, T O P SECRET) and a set of zero or more compartments (e.g., NATO, NUCLEAR, etc.). The security class is the basis on which all subject-teobject access is determined. The set of security classes and their interrelation define the permitted information flow between classes and they form a structure of a lattice.
Classification -A security class designation attached to a n object which reflects the importance of the object and the relative need to protect it from unauthorized disclosure. Since a classification is a security class (defined above), it includes a sensitivity level and a (possibly empty) set of compartments. h. Clearance -The degree of trust associated with a subject. It is expressed in the same way as a security class, t h a t is, as a sensitivity level and a (possibly empty) set of compartments. The clearance of a user is established on the basis of his background, and is associated with the userID. It is assigned by the Network Security Officer (NSO). The clearance of a process, a job or a program can be dynamically designated depending on whose behalf it is acting on. Current Security Level -The clearance of a subject t h a t is currently being recognized. A user may be designated a specific maximum level (i.e., his clearance), b u t this does not require t h a t he should be recognized at this level always. Instead, he may choose any clearance level (not exceeding his maximum level) as his current security level for processing purposes. j. Network Device -A physical resource within the network and is considered as an object. Examples are:
c.
d. e.
f.
g.
i.
processing elements, 1 / 0 devices and output devices. Process -A software/hardware mechanism residing in a computer system which performs a n execution function to allow a device to communicate with the computer system. It is always executed on behalf of a user t o perform a specific task. In such a case, the process is dynamically assigned a clearance which is equal to t h a t of the user.
0. ProcessID -A string of characters representing a process during the login procedure. Using this processID, the network will match the corresponding process and a clearance will be associated with this processID.
p. SubjectID -A string of characters representing a subject during a login procedure. It can be either a u s e r D or a processID. Role -The job t h a t a subject is performing. In our model, there are two roles t h a t will be made use of, viz. the role of downgrader, which is the authorization to lower the classification of an object file, and the role of NSO. T o act in a given role, the subject must be authorized for it. r. Reference -An object's name or a sequence of two or more object names. s. Operation -A function t h a t can be applied by a subject to an object. Some basic functions are listed in the following and additional operations may be included in specific network applications. i. transfer -to move the information contents from one file to another file by a subject; ii. create -to create a new object with a classification by a subject;
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reclassify -to change the current clearance of a user; iv. downgrade -to lower the classification of an object.
k.
I. m.
n.
q.
...
Some Specific Scenarios Indicating Different Connections of Interest
Towards identifying the specific functions the T N B is required to perform, we shall examine in this section the security requirements for connecting untrusted and trusted PES t o either an untrusted network or a trusted network.
The adjectives "trusted" and "untrusted" are used in this discussion t o connote their usual meaning as defined in TCSEC [43]. Specifically, a trusted entity may be operated either in the Controlled or in the Multilevel mode, whereas an untrusted entity may only be operated in either the Dedicated mode or the System High mode [44,45]. Let us consider the following four possible cases.
A. Untrusted PES on an Untrusted Network
In this case, no security policy is required to be implemented in both the network and the PES, which implies t h a t there exists no need for a TNB. For a Dedicated mode network, the Dedicated and t h e System High PES connected to the network must operate at the same sensitivity level t h a t the network can handle, whereas for a System High mode network, the Dedicated and the System High PES can operate at some level lower than the maximum level t h a t the network can handle. In the latter case, all users must be cleared to t h a t maximum level and some kind of discretionary access policy (in the TCBs) should be enforced.
B. Trusted PES on an Untrusted Network
In this case, the classifications of the PES must include the network sensitivity level i.e., the sensitivity level of the network must not be lower or higher than the range of classification levels of the PES. T h e principal feature of this scenario is t h a t the TCBs in t h e trusted PES are extended beyond the protection of local process-teprocess links across the network. Thus, the requirement for establishing a session between two processes in two different PES is t h a t both processes must have the same sensitivity level. The TCBs should not allow information at a level higher than the network sensitivity level to flow onto the network and properly mark incoming d a t a with the network-high sensitivity level. The granularity of this access control mechanism has a significant effect on the implementational complexity.
C. Untrusted PES on a Trusted Network
The classification of each untrusted PE must fall within the range of levels t h a t the network is trusted. T h e network must ensure t h a t any information unit at a higher classification should not flow into the files in a different PE at a lower level. Thus the network should enforce a mandatory security policy which includes the flow control function and the access control function and these functions could be performed by a centralized Access Controller or distributed in the network interface units. In addition, labels should be attached to each information unit while travelling across the network (or a label should be associated with each virtual circuit when a session is established) and the integrity of labels must be ensured.
D. Trusted PES on a Trusted Network
In this case, the classifications of the PES must overlap the corresponding levels for t h e network. Both the PES and the network must contain TCBs and a TNB, respectively, t o enforce the mandatory security policy and implement t h e flow control function. The PES must ensure t h a t the network can only receive d a t a within its range and similarly, the network must ensure t h a t each PE can only receive d a t a within its range. Additionally, each information unit should be associated with a label irrespective of whether it resides in the PES or is in flight on the network.
Some Typical Interactions Between Devices Within a
Trusted Network
Since our interest is t o develop a model for a multilevel secure network, we will focus our atkention on a trusted network. The discussion given here serves to illustrate via examples how the various network devices communicate with one another and indicates the kinds of operations t h a t must be performed by the processes in the devices. The purpose of this study is to determine which security policies must be enforced and which portions of t h e network should be trusted by examining the transactions between devices within the network.
Interactive Conversation Between Two Terminals
Since a terminal T is not capable of processing classified data, n o security policy need to be imposed when two terminals desire to establish a connection at any time regardless of their classifications. Such a relaxed connection requirement is not objectionable because conversation between terminals does not involve any transfer of files or other stored information and it also permits a superior to give a command or advice to his subordinate even though such conversation violates the security rules if a conventional security policy (such as the *-property in Bell-Lapadula model) is enforced.
Communication Between a Terminal and a Processing Element (PE)
The conditions for permitting a terminal T and the PE t o communicate can be determined as in the following. Detailed arguments for arriving at these conditions are omitted here and may be found in (471.
Clearance of network user U using the terminal, CL must be higher than or equal to the classification of #:
CST.
For a trusted PE,
a. CL, must be greater than or equal to the classification of object file 0, CS,, in order for U t o access 0.
Content of 0 will be displayed on T only if CS, U can modify the content of 0 only if CL, =
CST.= CS, (and is authorized t o perform such modification).
For an untrusted PE, the condition for connection is CS > CSpE (i.e., the terminal is cleared for displGirg all d a t a stored in PE).
b.
2 cs,.
d .
Communication Between Two PES
Let us assume t h a t a process P in PE, is desirous of communicating with a process P in PA,. Let CLp, and CL,, denote the clearances of P, and %' CSpE, and csg2 denote the classifications of PE, and P& respectively. ote t h a t CSPE, and CSPE, denote a range of levels and CSPE, = CSPE, means overlap and CSPE, 2 cspE2 means the range of levels for PE, includes the range of levels for PE,. Let TNBpE, and TNBpE, denote the enforcement mechanisms residing in the Network Interface Units (NIU) connecting PE, and PE, respectively t o the network. The PES could be either trusted or untrusted. Hence in the following discussion we will examine the three cases -when PE, and PE, are both untrusted, one of PE, and PE, is trusted while the other is untrusted, and when both PE, and PE, are trusted.
(i) When Both PES are Untrusted
The connection requirement is t h a t both PES and both processes must be at the same sensitivity level, i.e., CSPEl = CSpE, and CLp1 = CLp,.
(ii) When a Trusted P E wishes to Communicate with an Untrusted PE.
Without loss of generality let us assume t h a t PE, is a trusted system and PE, is untrusted. The condition for P, in PE, to communicate with PE, is CL,, 2 CSpE,. Then TNBPEl is required to enforce the flow control function so t h a t any file in PE, t h a t could be read by P, will not be allowed to flow into files in PE, having lower classifications than CSPE1. Similarly, TNBpE, should enforce similar flow control so t h a t files in PE, d o not flow into files in PE, with classifications lower than CSpE2. O n the other hand, in order for P, in PE, t o establish a connection with PE,, CLp, must be within the range of the classification levels of PE,. T h e
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transfer of information between PE, and PE, is controlled by TNBpE, and TNBpE, in the same manner as described above.
(iii) When Both PES are Trusted.
For describing the connection requirements between the two PES in this case, let us assume that the classification levels of PE, range from L1 t o H1 and the classification levels of PE, range from L2 to H2. The first requirement for connecting the two PES is that the two ranges of sensitivity levels must have a t least some overlap, i.e., L2 < H1 < H2 or L1 < H2 < H1 or L2 5 L l and H1 5 H2 or L1 5 L2 and H2 5 H1. The second requirement is that only when CL,, L2, the request for connection by P, in PE, with PE, is granted; otherwise, it is rejected. The corresponding requirements when a process P, in PE, wishes to establish a session with PE, can be determined in an identical manner. After the connection is set up, TNBp enforces the security policy to prevent the flow of files at figher classifications in PE, into the files a t lower levels in PE,, and TNBpE, will enforce similar flow control to prevent any illicit flow from PE, to PE,.
Communication Between a PE and a Printer
Let the classification of the printer PTR be CS, , , . When a process P in P E requests to output a file to the printer, the connection between P and PTR will be granted only when C L p s CSp, and the check is executed by TNBpE.
Implementations and Functions of the TNB
In order to describe precisely the approach used t o develop the network security model and the details of the functions of the TNB needed, let us consider an illustrative scenario depicted in Figure 1 , which shows a simple architecture of a secure computer network consisting of three stations: a processing element PE (e.g., a VAX computer system), a printer PTR, and a terminal T. Let us denote by NIU , NIUpE and NIUpT, the NIUs that link the terminal T , the ?E, and the printer PTR with the network respectively. Each NIU performs the required functions that allow a station to exchange information with other stations connected to the network and these functions are transparent to the stations. The required TNB must perform two primary functions: control the establishment of a connection between two network devices and appropriately control the flow of Elassified information between the stations. Each NIU is assumed to have the TNB in place as part of its operating functions and this is analogous to the TCB installed in the P E as part of the operating system kernel. The TCB performs diffcrent functions from what are required of the TNB. Note that the TCB controls the access to the sensitive data residing in the P E to only the legitimate users cleared to use the P E and to restrict the transfer of information between files stored within the same PE. On the other hand, the TNB controls the transfer of data between files stored in different PES once they are sent out on the network. The authority to access a piece of classified information stored in a file within a PE is not of concern to the TNB. As a result, the contents of a classified file which is to be transferred from a PE to another PE will be first checked by the TCB in the host PE to determine the legitimacy of accessing this information. When the request is granted, the TNB will determine if this information could be sent t o a file residing in the other PE.
Let TNB,, TNB,, and TNBpTR represent the TNBs residing in the corresponding NIUs, i.e., NIUT, NIUp , and NIUpTR respectively. At each NIU, a table 07 the classifications of all the devices connected to the network is stored in the memory. Furthermore, an access matrix is stored in the memory of each NIU which specifies the authority to access the network devices by the users. Setting up such an access control mechanism will be based on the job related need-to-know of the users and the discretion decision of transferring authority to gain access to specific users. The scenario depicted in Figure 1 shows a user A, a t a terminal T , who wishes to access the PE (for example a VAX system) in order to read a classified file, say file a. Then, he wishes to transfer the content of file a that he has just read to a printer PTR in order t o obtain a hard copy of that information. Finally, he may wish to write into the file a (i.e., to modify the content) after he has read it. The procedure for allowing user A t o access the PE requires two operation stages which we will call the setup stage and the Connection granting stage. The setup stage is the login procedure for a user t o be logged onto the network while the connection granting stage involves the procedure for two network devices to establish their session. The following steps describe the details of the two stages.
A. Setup Stage S t e p 1 .
User A first notifies the NIU, of his desire to access the network. NIUT returns a prompt to ask for a username.
Step 2.
User A responds with his name. Step 3.
NIU, then responds with another prompt requesting for a password.
Step 4 .
User A enters his password (which will not display on the terminal).
Step 5.
TNB, compares the username and the password with the ones stored in the memory. Also, TNB, checks the clearance of user A against the classification of T. If the username and the password match and the clearance of user A is higher than or equal t o the classification of T, an appropriate prompt sign will be shown on the terminal to indicate that NIUT is ready to accept further instructions from the user. Also, NIUT will keep a copy of the userID and his corresponding clearance in its memory for recording purposes.
After user A successfully logs onto the network, he requests NIUT for establishing a session with PE.
NIUT obtains the classification of P E and T from its memory. Then TNBT compares the clearance of user A, and the classification of T and P E , and checks the corresponding entry of the access matrix to determine if user A has the need-to-know privilege to access PE. If user A is privileged, the request for the connection is granted and a connection is extended from terminal T to PE. Another login procedure is required in order that user A can have access t o the files stored in PE and the policy for determining this login procedure is enforced by the TCB residing in PE. When the access t o file a in PE is granted by the TCB according to a set policy, the transfer of the contents of this file to terminal T (for display on that terminal) is controlled by TNBp As described in Section 2.3, the contents of file a can be &played on terminal T only if the classification of file U is lower than or equal to the classification of terminal T. After user A has read the contents of file a, he wishes t o print that information on a hard copy through printer PTR.
For this, an appropriate process in PE is required to establish a session with printer PTR. The process first executes the login procedure as described in Steps 1 t o 5 . After the setup stage, TNBPE keeps a record of the clearance of the process
B. Connection Granting Stage
Step 6.
Step 7.
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which is the clearance of user A and the corresponding processID in the memory of NIUPE. The connection granting stage involves the steps of comparing the security levels of the process and the printer. When the clearance of the process is lower than or equal to the classification of P T R , the connection between PE and PTR is granted. The content of file a is now allowed to be printed on P T R since the classification of file a is lower than or equal to the clearance of user A (i.e., the clearance of the process). In order for user A to write into the file a, the TNB, must first compare the clearance of user A and the classification of file a. If the classification of file a is higher than t h e clearance of user A, he can only write additional content into file a but cannot read its contents. O n the other hand, if the classification of file a and the clearance of user A are at the same level, user A can read the content of file a before modifying it. Hence, if the clearance of user A is higher than the classification of file a, user A must reduce his current security level down t o the classification level of file a. Then, user A can either read the file a and modify it or just write the new content into it.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL 3.1 Some Basic Assumptions
In developing any formal security model, it is necessary t o begin with certain basic assumptions on the security environment being modelled, such as the feasibility of trusting the users not t o compromise the security of information to which they have legitimate access, the proper functioning of the network protocols and of the devices etc. For the present development, we shall make the following assumotions.
C.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
1.

3.2
f h e r e exists a single Network Security Officer (NSO) and he is trusted to assign clearances to network users, user's roles and classifications t o network devices properly.
Each network user has a unique UserID and a password and each process has a unique processID. All devices within the network have comparable security classes. A highly reliable user authentication mechanism is provided during the login procedure.
T h e PES connecting t o the network could be either trusted or untrusted P"k. For each trusted P E , there exists a security validation mechanism (TCB) to enforce the security policy (both discretionary access control and mandatory access control) within t h a t system. For each untrusted P E , all users who wish to have access will be cleared or approved to the highest level of information t h a t is processed in t h a t PE.
Appropriate network communication protocols exist to ensure reliable information transmission across the network. An appropriate encryption technique for protection of information transmitted over the network channel is provided t o prevent unauthorized disclosure and unauthorized modification. Thus, the network nodes are equipped with devices t h a t process the encryption algorithm used and an effective and tamperproof key management protocol is employed. Physical security measures t o protect network devices from sabotaging attacks are present. Normal users are expected to properly handle all classified information and follow the security regulations. In particular, they are expected to properly classify all information which they handle and properly define the access sets for the objects t h a t they create so t h a t the discretionary access control can be properly enforced.
For a multilevel secure network, it should be ensured
Security Assertions
t h a t A l .
A2.
A3.
A4.
A5.
A6.
A7.
A8.
A9.
the following assertions hold at all times. A user can use a terminal only when his clearance is higher than or equal to the classification of t h a t terminal.
A user may invoke an operation on an object only if the access control matrix has a corresponding entry t h a t allows the user (or a process executing on his behalf) to perform the requested operation on the specified object. The clearance and the role recorded for a user and the classification of a network device can only be set by a user wit.h the role of Network Security Officer. Only the user himself or the Network Security Officer can alter the current security level of t h a t user and the current security level cannot exceed the maximum clearance of t h a t user. Any information unit transmitted over the network must be labelled with its classification. Any information unit displayed on a terminal or printed on an output device must have the classification lower than or equal t o the classification of t h a t device. The classification of an object is always at least as high as the maximum classification of the objects it contains. Information removed from a n object inherits its classification. Similarly, an information unit can only be inserted into an object with equal or higher classification.
T h e classification of a n object can be downgraded only by a user with the role of downgrader.
A network device can establish a connection with another device only under the following conditions: When one device is a terminal and the other is a PE, the classification of the terminal must be within or higher than the range of classification of the PE.
When both devices are PES, a.
i. and both are untrusted PES, the classifications of both PES must be equal;
ii. and one is trusted while the other is untrusted, the classification of the untrusted PE must be within the range of classification of t h e trusted P E , and/or if a process in the trusted PE requests a connection, the process must have a clearance higher than or equal to the classification of the untrusted P E ;
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and both are trusted, the range of classification levels of the two PES must overlap and the process requesting a connection must not have a clearance lower than the lowest level of the other P E .
c. When one device is a PE and the other is an output device (e.g., printer), the classification of the output device must be within or higher than the range of classification of the PE and the process requesting a connection must have a clearance lower than or equal to the classification level of the output device.
Development of the Formal Model
In this section, we shall use some basic concepts of set theory to define the notion of a secure state and to describe the various operations and transformations t h a t cause a change of state. It is then shown t h a t the operations and transformations are security preserving in the sense t h a t a network starting from an initial secure set will only attain future states t h a t are secure if the assertions stated in the previous section are satisfied.
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Model Description
Let SB denote the set of all subjects included in the network, U denote the set of all network users and P denote the set of processes executing on behalf of the users. Clearly U C SB and P SB. Also, U U P = S B and P and U are mutually exclusive i.e., U n P = 0.
Let OB denote the set of all objects included in the network, and ND denote the set of all network devices connected to the network. OB consists of all d a t a files, information units, physical memory locations, and network devices, etc. Thus ND C OB. Let IO denote the set of all 1/0 devices, O T denote the set of all output devices and PE denote the set of all processing elements. Evidently, IO G ND, O T C ND, PE c ND 3 IO U O T U PE = ND and Let SC denote a set of security classes which corresponds to a set of disjoint classes of sensitivity level and compartment (category) sets. Instead of being restrictive in using the terms employed in the military classification system such as " T O P SECRET, SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL and UNCLASSIFIED", we shall define S C = { L l , L2, ..., Ln} where n is a finite integer. T h e relationship between two security classes within this set is denoted by 5 , where 5 is a partial order on Li for 1 2 i 5 n such t h a t (SC, 5 ) is a partial ordered set.
Let SI denote a set of subjectIDs, U1 denote a set of userIDs and P I denote a set of processIDs. Evidently, U1 SI, P I C SI and U1 U P I = SI and U1 n P I = 8 . Let R F denote a set of references.
In the following discussion, the elements of any set are represented by the corresponding lower case letters, for
Then the network security model NSM is defined by We shall describe these quantities in the following. where A T is the set of current accesses which is S F SL is the subject-login function; SM is the subject-mapping function; RM is the reference-mapping function.
The current access triple A T = (SB,ND,a) is a set of current accesses t h a t indicates which subject currently has the access to which network device. T h e existence or nonexistence of access privilege is denoted by the access mode a, which has the representation {connect} for the existence of connect access privilege and a blank when connect access privilege does not exist. The access triple (SB,ND,a) may also be regarded as an access matrix whose rows represent t h e subjects s b E SB and whose columns represent network devices nd E ND, and whose entry is the access mode a. T h e described by the triple (SB, ND, a); is a security binding function; determination of placing such access command in the entries of the access matrix is based on the discretion decisions made t o permit the different subjects t o gain access to the various network devices.
The security binding function S F binds each entity to a security class sc E SC. It may be one of the three types of functions -clearance (CL), current security level (CSL) and Classification (CS). The clearance function CL : SB -+ S C binds each subject (user or process) to a security class. Thus sc = CL(sb) represents the clearance of s b E SB. The current security level function CSL : SB -+ S C binds each subject s b to a security class representing the current security level of s b such t h a t CSL(sb) E S C and CSL(sb) 5 CL(sb). The classification function C S : O B + S C binds each object to a security class (or a range of security classes) i.e., CS(ob) = sc represents the classification of o b E OB.
The function subject-login, SL, is a one-to-one mapping from a subset of SI into R F , t4e set of references t h a t correspond t o network devices (i.e., a representation of processes and users being logged in to specific network devices). Also, the function user-login, UL, is a one-to-one mapping from a subset of U1 into R F . Note t h a t U1 c SI.
The function subject-mapping, SM, is a one-to-one mapping from SI into SB. This function identifies a subject corresponding to a subjectID. Also, the function usermapping, UM, is a one-to-one mapping from U1 into U. Note t h a t U1 SI and U C SB. T h e function reference-mapping, RM, is a one-to-one mapping from a subset of RF into OB.
This function identifies a specific object t h a t is named by a reference.
With the above definitions, it is possible to more precisely introduce the notion of s t a t e as follows: Definition 1. A state s is an element of S = (AT, SF, SL, SM, RM) where A T is the access triple, S F is the security binding function which may be one of the three functions CL, CSL and CS, SL is the subject login function, SM is the subject mapping function, and RM is the reference mapping function, satisfying the following properties:
dom(CS) = rng(RM), 3.
4.
dom(SL) C dom(SM),
5.
rng(SL)
rng(CL) U rng(CS) = S C , and
The last condition simply ensures t h a t two subjects are prevented from being logged in simultaneously to the same device with an identical reference.
The initial state so is a specific designated value attained by the state.
(ii) Set of Operations, OP:
O P is a set of operations t h a t affect the flow of information from one network to another. These operations may change the security levels of the subjects and the objects in the network. In the following, we shall introduce each operation with a brief description of the conditions (on the state variables) for executing the operation and the conditions t h a t result from the execution.
The operation executed by a subject s b E S B of transferring the contents of an object b E O B to another object d E OB is defined by TRANSFER(b,d), which represents the action t h a t causes an information flow from object b to object d. The conditions for such transfer are 11B.2.7.
Note that the content of the new d after the operation will be the concatenation of b and the old d and this retains the classification CS(d).
The operation of creating a new file b by a subject sb E SB with a classification sc is defined by CREATE(b,sc). The result of this operation is CS(b) = CSL(sb) = sc where se E sc.
The operation of changing the current security level of a user U E U t o a new level cl E SC is defined by RECLASSIFY(u,cl) . The security requirements for this operation are that cl = CSL(u) satisfy the conditions cl 5 CL(u) and cl 2 CS(T,) where T u E ND is the terminal currently logged on by the user U. This operation is restricted to be performed by the user U or a user with the role of Network Security Officer which is represented by NSO.
The operation of lowering the classification of a file b to a new level sc E SC is defined by DOWNGRADE(b,sc). The type of file b must be mail file and sc 5 CS(b). This operation is restricted to only users or processes with the role of downgrader which is represented by DWNGR.
Finally, the operation of assigning a security class sc E SC to an entity e E SB U ND is defined by ASSIGIV(e,sc) which represents the action that causes the assignment of the security class sc (clearance or classification) to the entity (a subject or a network device). This operation is restricted to be performed by a user with the role of NSO.
(iii) Transformation Function T:
The transformation T describes the transition from one state to the succeeding state by applying one or a sequence of operations described above. It can hence be defined as a mapping T : S I X O P X S -S where s ' = T(si,op,s) is the resulting state due to an operation op E O P executed by a subject with ID si E SI when the starting state is s E S.
Security Requirements
In order to describe the security requirements for the network, let us first consider the conditions for a state of the network t o be secure. Fundamental t o the concept of a secure state are two properties: the setup security property and the connection security property. The setup security property describes the security during the login procedure executed by a network user, whereas the secure establishment of a session between two network devices is described by the connection security property. Other requirements for the state to be secure are that each information unit must be associated with a label and any information a t a higher classification must not be allowed to be transferred t o a file in a network device with a lower classification.
Definition 2. A state satisfies the setup security property if W x E dom(UL), 1. CL(x) 2 CS(y) for y = T,, where T, = RM(UL(x)); 2. CSL(x) 5 CL(x).
In the above, T, denotes the terminal t h a t is currently logged on by a user x. It may be noted t h a t the first condition is equivalent t o the security assertion A1 described in Section 3.2 Delinition 9. A state satisfies the connection secun'ty property if V (p,q,a) E AT such that a # 0 , q @ O T + CL(p) 2 min{cl, c2, ..., ci} where ci is the classification of file i stored in q; q E O T + CL(p) 2 CS(q).
1.
2.
In the ordered triple (p,q,a), p is the process executing on behalf of a user logged onto the network and q is the network device with which p would like to establish a connection. Also, the condition a # 0 indicates the presence of a discretionary security policy in addition to a mandatory security policy. Note that, assertion A9 described in Section 3.2 is incorporated in the conditions for a connection secure state.
Before we state the next definition, let us define a few terms that will be used. The value of an object is represented by a value function V, i.e., V(ob) is the value of an object ob. Let t p be an element of the set IO U OT. Then, the function DP(tp) is a set of ordered pairs {(so,,g!), (so2,g2) , ..., (so,,g,)} such that gi is the value t h a t will be displayed on tp. In each ordered pair (soi,gi), soi is either a subject or an object and gi is either a reference, a subjectID, or V(ob), CS(ob), CSL(ui), CL(ui).
Definition 4. A state s E S is secure if
Note that assertions A4 and A5 described in Section 3.2 correspond directly t o the third and the fourth conditions here.
In the following, we will define the required conditions for the security of transformations when certain operations are executed. Let x, denote an object x E OB a t state s such that CS(x,) denotes the classification of object x a t state s.
Similarly, for any y E SB, let ys denote the subject a t state s such that CL(ys) denotes the clearance of subject y a t t h a t state. Also, let R(ui) denote the set of permitted user roles for the user ui E UI. Some typical roles for the users, described earlier, are the NSO (which role permits assignment of security clearance and classifications) and DWNGR (which role permits the downgrading of the classification of a file). For two elements (messages) x and y E OB, let x-y denote the concatenation of the two.
Definition 5. A transformation T is Transfer Secure if v ui E UI, op E OP, s E S, s' E S 3 T(ui,op,s) = s ', and V x,y s satisfies the setup security property; s satisfies the connection security property;
for every x E rng(RM), CS(x) exists; rng(RM) and V z E IOUOT.
1.
2. CS(y,) 2 CS(x,), and 3 9 E rng(RM) 3 'y = x-y, 3. CS(y, .) = CS(y,).
In this definition, x is the file t h a t will be transferred to y and y is the new file. Note that, assertion A7 described in Section 3.2 corresponds directly t o this property.
Definition 6. A transformation T is Create Secure if 'd ui E UI, op E O P , s E S, s ' E S 3 T(ui,op,s) = s ', and ' d sc E SC, and for any y E rng(SM) 3 x E rng(RM) that is created Definition 7. A transformation T is Downgrade Secure if t/ ui E UI, op E OP, s E S, s ' E S 3 T(ui,op,s) = s ', and V x E rng(RM) denoting the object t h a t is downgraded, CS(x,.) < CS(x,) assertion A8 in the informal model. 
DWNGR E R(ui,).
Note that, this definition is a formal statement of
This definition restricts that only the NSO has the authority to assign classifications to devices and clearances t o 1.
3.
R(ui,); users, and further restricts t h a t only t h e user himself and/or the NSO can change the user's current security level. It hence corresponds to assertion A3 of the informal model.
Security Verification
For a verification of the security of the network implementing the present model (hereinafter we will use the word "system" to refer to the network with the security mechanism implemented), let us consider t h e operation of the T N B at each stage of a typical connection between a user and a network device, illustrated in section 2.4. Our objective in this analysis is to identify the conditions t h a t the system must satisfy in order to ensure t h a t security properties are not violated at any stage of the connection. The results will be summarized in the form of definitions and theorems. In the interests of conciseness, proofs of the theorems will be omitted.
They, however, follow from rather simple arguments and may be found in [47].
Setup Stage (Login Procedure)
During this stage, there is executed no operation t h a t could cause a transition of the system s t a t e and hence a system starting at an initial state t h a t satisfies t h e setup security property will never go to a s t a t e t h a t does not satisfy it. The definition below formally states this.
Definition 9. A system described by the model NSM = <S,sq,OP,T> satisfies the setup security property if the state so satisfies it.
Connection Granting Stage
As indicated earlier, a transformation results in a transition of the state. Hence, for a system starting at an initial state so, the application of a sequence of transformations will result in a sequence of states {so, sl, s2, ...}. We then have the following.
Definition 10. A system described by the model NSM = <S,so,OP,T> satisfies the connection security property if each s t a t e in the sequence {so,s1,s2, ...} satisfies it, where sj = T(si,opj,sj-l) for some si E SI, opj E O P and tl j = 1,2, ... .
The conditions for connection security can now be stated in the following theorem. Theorem 1 . A system described by the model NSM = <S,so!OP,T> satisfies the connection security property if (i) the initial state so satisfies the connection security property and (ii) the transformation T defined by T(si,op,s) = s* where s = (at,SF,RM,SL,SM) and s* = (at*,SF*,RM*,SL*, SM*) satisfies the condition, at = (p,q,a) = at* for some p E S B and q = E O B e a = {connect}.
Information Manipulating Stage
Once a connection is granted, a manipulation of the information by any transformation can take place. Since we have already identified the conditions for the security of each transformation resulting from t h e execution of each type of operation, the only question t h a t may arise is whether a sequence of these secure operations can cause a transition from a secure state t o a n insecure state. T h e following theorem states t h a t any arbitrarily executed sequence of secure operations will lead a secure initial s t a t e to a state t h a t remains secure.
Theorem 2. A system described by the model NSM = <S,s,,OP,T> satisfies the operational security property if the transformation T is transfer secure, create secure, downgrade secure and assign secure.
We are now in a position to s t a t e a basic security theorem to show t h a t a system is secure if its initial s t a t e is secure and every transformation satisfies the conditions enunciated in Theorem 1 and 2, together with an additional condition t h a t information will never be output to a device t h a t has a lower classification than t h a t of the information itself.
Definition 11. A system described by the model NSM = <S,so,OP,T> is secure if every s t a t e in the sequence {so, s l , s2, ...} where sj ,= T(si,opj,sj-J for some si E SI, o p j E O P and j = 1,2, ... , IS a secure state.
Theorem 3. A system described by the model NSM = <S,so,OP,T> is secure if the initial s t a t e so is a secure s t a t e and the transformation T defined by T(si,op,s) = s* where s = (at,SF,RM,SL,SM) and s* = (at*,SF*,RM*,SL*,SM*) satisfies the following conditions:
1. conditions in Theorem 1, 2. conditions in Theorem 2, 3. tl 2 E rng(RM*) and x E rng(RM), V f E rng(SL*)
and y E rndSL). and V 1 = RM*(v) and z = RM!y), if (x,V(x)) DP(z) and (?,V(?))'€'DP(2) then CS(x) 2 CS(2).
The theorems presented above can be interpreted as formal statements of the requirements for the network security mechanism and provide a fairly detailed description of the functions which a security kernel implementation of the network should ensure.
CONCLUSIONS
The two principal features of the network security model presented in this paper are the following. Firstly, it models a multilevel security environment for the network. Secondly, i t permits both trusted and untrusted computer systems to be connected to t h e network since the security enforcement mechanism can be implemented at the Network Interface Unit of each network device. The model is developed from an integration of the access control and information flow control concepts and utilizes the distributed nature of a Trusted Network Base (TNB) t h a t implements the security enforcement mechanism.
T h e model gives a precise policy on how access control should be enforced. The access control, which is the major component in the design of secure operating systems, is found t o be important in network security as well. T h e network access control policy determines the requirements for establishing connection between two devices without violating the security conditions. The model also gives a precise policy for controlling information flow between two devices. T h e flow of information is caused by a set of operations which can be modelled as mappings between states. For the defined operations, it is shown t h a t information will not be transferred from the higher security classes to t h e lower classes as a result of these mappings. Thus the model provides a basis for the design of a viable security architecture for a computer network.
The present study can be extended in several directions by further investigations. The model presented here provides a detailed abstract level description of the security enforcement mechanism for a single network. Applying techniques t h a t use a hierarchy of formal specifications to the kernel design [48], the design of a secure network can be taken in a step by step manner from the abstract model to the kernel implementations. Analysis of covert channels in the network security model by using techniques described in [49,50] appears feasible. Another useful direction is to extend t h e present model to include additional security requirements (protection against denial of service) and more complex network requirements (interconnections of networks, multiple jurisdictive authorities etc.).
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